University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Honors Theses

Student Research

Winter 1967

United States opinion from Munich to the
Blitzkreig
Barbara Evans

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/honors-theses
Recommended Citation
Evans, Barbara, "United States opinion from Munich to the Blitzkreig" (1967). Honors Theses. Paper 310.

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LIBRARIES .

1111

~1 ~1 1 1 ~ I ~ 1~1 1 1 ~ 1111 ~I~ I~ 1111 ~1 1 1 1
3 3082 01029 0293

UNITED STATES

mo::

OFI!JIOi~

L::mrcrr TO' T:lE ELITZKriEIG

Barbara Evans
January 16, 1967

Outline
Introduotion
I. The flbdd before Munioh.
A. Revisonism.
B. Isolationism.

c.
II.

Roosevelt.
Fall, 1939.

A.

Munich.

B. Pogroms.
III. Winter, 1938-1939.

A. Roosevelt's new polloy.

B. Isolationist reaotion.

c.

Publio reaction.

N. Spring, 1939.
A.

Rape of Czeohoslovalda.

l. Government reaction.

a.

Public reaction.

B. Saturday Surprise.
1. Goverru1111nt intention.
2. Public reaction.

v.

Summer, 1939.

A. Neutriil.ity legislation.
B. Public mood.

VIo. War, 1939.
A. Gerlnan-Soviet pact.

l. Government reaction.
2. Public reaction.
B. War.

1. Roosevelt.

a. Reaction
b. Attitude toward Europe.
2. Public reaction.
a. War.

b. U.S. non-involvement.

Introduction

Jl Q...4-CL ra "' I "._J)
In the late nineteen-thirties 11 isolationism11 1M•l:· I- tiDt American a.ttitude~toward

Europe.

Basically, the term, used to describe that period,

v.thi~ ~ .. c..,..~t...&

refers to the belie.ts"Jt.hat the United States should h~ve no part in
foreign

q~arrels.

T'nis paper will attempt to analyzo the feelings of the majority
of Americans.
e:xtre~~sts

Many

ffiOn

counselled non-involvement tor many reasons, and

ranged from thd Catholic priest, Father Coughlin, a man with

definite pro-German sympathies, to Charles A. Lindberg, who thought that
Hitler could not be beaten.

Attention here will not be directed at theso

extre:nely small fringe groups, but at the "average" American, as far as
his thoughts can be known, and at the political leaders of the period,
as far as they allow th6ir thoughts to be known.

Heither will an attempt be r:i.a.de to de5cribe geographical variations
in tho stren!!th of ieolation:i.sm, for tne polls do not reveal significant differences in reactions to events.

They show that the !-iiddle and
+~Ls ~~; lo.ro ..

Far West tended to be slightly stronger in their adherence to tlole ee.n-i'#,

~s

,

than were the East nnd South, and

-?~t..

~

observation is

s~pported

by the fact that isolationist leaders in Congress represented the former

areas.

The data, however, are not sufficient to permit any further gen-

eralizat.ion.

'

Chapter 1
The Mood Before Munich
Isolationism came to a peak in the turmoil of the thirties. both at
hom$ and abroad.

The emotional shock of the Depression coupled with the

aggressive activittes of new despots in Europe and Asia convinced Am.erican' that they should concentrate on rdconetructing their own demoralized
country.

As the decade wore on the conviction grew that strong legal

b.1r:::-iers should be erected to keep the United

State~

freo of all foreign

entn.nglemants.
On May l, 193t Congref:a, led by its more extreme isolationist elements, passed the Neutrality Act.

It decreed that, when war broke out

abroad, the President should declare that hostilities existed, and upon
his declaration a battery of restrictions would go into effect.

In addi-

tion to outlawing all trade in munitions, the bill prohibited non-military ccmmerce with belligerents on any basis other than "cash and carry."
Section 3 said that no one would be allowed to deal in the bonds of or
extend any credit to these countries.
prohibited.

Even voluntary contributions were

In addition, the President could forbid the entry of any

warship of a belligerent into United States ports, and no Americans~
ninety days after the initial proclame.tion, would be allowed to travel
l

on vessels of the warring countries.
Behind this act stood the belief that the United States should have
'

no foreign responsibilities outside the Western Hemisphere.

.

According

to the revisionist interpretation of World War I then popular, guilt tor
starting the conflict lay equally on the

sho~tlders

of all

combat.ah~..

3

2

The

ide~

was carried even further, and some Americans claimed that

Europe '.-ms incapable of solving her proble:ns pencefully, citing as evidence

t~1~

saber-rattling of :Utler and H.lssolini.
1

A ·writer summed up

the comnon opinion by saying, "War occurs in Europe about every thirty
2

years a:ld it has done so since about the beginning of time. 11
Why, then, had the United States, a peace-loving nation, fought for
the Allies?

Three forces had played on her for three different reasons.

Preside:it Wilson and his highest aides were warmongers.

Britain and

France had invested heavily in this country and thus roused the capitalistic affections of big business.

Combining with the manufacturers,

o_,QJ)<k-\)

the President a4e.e6 his battle cries to theirs and to those of the propaganda flowing from Britain.

As a result of this collusion, the Ameri-

can peonle were led to believe that they were embarking on a great crusade.
One essential point in revisionist theory was that the crusade had
been fruitless.

American troops had won the war for the Allies, but they

had lost the fight for ideals.

At the Versailles Conference Clemenceau

and Lloyd George revealed that the Central Powers had no monopoly on a
desire

f~r

conquest.

The vindictive settle:nent imposed there on Germany

had as its purpose the gratification of French and British greed.

In

their lust for land, they disregarded the well-being of the conquered
and, therefore, directly created the conditions which were to produce
Hitler.
Americans believed they had something to learn from their World ';;ar I
experience.

They had sent troops to die for the Allies, and the Allies

had proved no more dedicated to making the world safe for democracy than
were the Central Powers.

The country

al~o

remembered the horror of the

world's first experience with mechanized warfare, and the mass violence
seemed even worse, because it had been pointless.
sum.~ed

Nye, usually an extre:nist,

Senator Gerald P.

up public feeline when he said, early

in 1939, "I r:iake bold to asse~that 20 years ago we were led like lambs
to the slaughter into the most cruel and
world has ever witnessed."

~erciless

and useless war the

3

American foreign policy, therefore, should pursue a course consistent with Washington's pronounce:nents against entangling alliances.

The

President must stand for the ideals of democracy, he should preach those
ideals to the world, but he must never go beyond verbal encouragement,
and he should stay aloof from even peaceful settlements of foreign
4
quarrels.
Revisionism appealed to

A.~erica

in the thirties, because it re-

fleeted other basic beliefs then held.

The country had entered World

War I by voluntary choice, for it had not been

ph~~jcally

menaced.

War

twenty years later would be a repeat of the first, with airplanes and
strategic bombing, but it would remain in Europe.
to stay at peace, therefore, the oceans

wo~ld

If the country wanted

protect her from attack,

just as they always had.
"~+; ..::>~ .....

And the oo:w:ltry would stay at peace.

As Senator Atthur H. Van-

denburg said, " •••We are not, we cannot be, the world's protector or the
world's policeman."

5

As long as the United States could import the ne-

cessary raw materials, she could

re~ain

aloof from the perpetual foreign

quarrels and solve her own problems, which included a depression still
unconquered.

The first reaction of a child of the Atomic Age to such apparent
blindness is, "You cannot wish an a'._".gressor away. 11

Unfortunately this

lesson had to be taught by Hitler not onlJ• to America, but also to England and France.

In 193g, United States public opinion was shocked and

alarmed by the ruthlessness of Nazism, whicn the people saw as the most
SS ()C\..,+-1 u :'
powerfQl form of oppression the world had yet produced, but the coantr,
was

n~t

aware of the danger it posed.

k~erican)considered

Hitler a

madman who had victimized the German people, but they hoped, as did the
rest

~f

the world, that he could be reasoned with.

Few men realized the

lengt.1s to which he was willing to go, nor did they know how far Germ.any
would follow him.

When the events of 1938-1939 gave a clear indication

of his megalomania, Americans grew even more afraid of war.
was

n~t,

The fear

however, that the country would be attacked, but that she

would once again be duped into renewing her crusade for democracy, a crusade that no one could pursue without

disaste~.

Joining these beliefs was another which the cynical may say explains all of isolationism.

Americans thought Britain and France, lead-

ing the smaller, free European countries, could defeat the Axis, if war
finally came.

On September 13, 1938, a Gallup Poll reported that 86%
I

0f

D

those questioned had faith in the victory of the democracies.
later, when Poland lay in ruins from the blitzkreig,
same question the same way.

One year

71% answered the

7

To place too much emphasis on the importance of this belief, however, is to ignore the facts.

Hitler conquered all of Europe and

bo~cW.. ""En~i I\
a'd:e se :SPitaia to rt1:el.5re before the United States

entere~

·;:e-

the war, and if,

The

ide~

was carried even turther, and some Americans claimed that

Europe was incapable of solving her proble:ns peacefully, citing as evidence t:1e saber-rattling or Hitler and Mussolini.

A writer swruned up

the comnon opinion by saying, "War occurs in Europe about every thirty
.
2
years a11d it has done so since about the boginning of time."
Why, then, had the United States, a peace-loving nation, fought for

the Allies?

Three torcea had played on her tor three different reaaons.

Prc£id.e;1t Wilson and hif' highef>t aides were warmongers.
Fran::e had invested

he~vily

in this country

listic affectione of big business.
the President

~:nd t~,,_t:

Britain and

r.)used the capita-

Combining with the manufacturers,

addes his battle cries to theirs and to those

paganda fiowing from Britain.

or tho pro-

As a rar.ult of this collusion, the Ameri-

can people were led to believe that they were embarking on a great crusade.
One essential point in revisionist theory was that the crusade had
been fruitless.

American troops had won the war for the Allies, but they

had lost the fight tor ideals.

At the Versailles Conference Clemenceau

and Lloyi George raven.led that the Contx•nl Powars had no monopoly on a
desire

f~r

conquest.

The vindictive

settlo~ent

imposed tnere on Germany

had az its purpose the gratification of French and British greed.

In

their lust tor land, they disregarded the well-being of the conquered
and, therefore, directly created tho conditions which were to produce
Hitler.
Americans believed they had something to learn from their World r.-;ar I
experienoe.

They had sent troops to die for the Allies, and the Allies

had proved no more dedicated to making the world safe for
were the Central Powers.

The country

al~;o

than

de~ocracy

remembered the horror of the

world's first experience with mechanized warfare, and tne mass violence
seemed even worse, because it had been pointl.,ss.
Nye, usually an extra:nint,

s~~ed

Senator Gerald P.

up public feeling when he said, early

in 1939 1 "I r:iake bold to asset"hhat 20 years ago we were led like lambs
to the slaughter into the rnost cruel and ;nerciltJss and useless war the
world has ever witnessed."

3

American foreign policy, therefore, should pursue a course consis-

tent with Washington's prono:mce:nents against untaneling alliance"•

The

President mu3t stand for the ideals of de:11ocracy, he should preach those
.igeale to the world, but he must never go beyond verbal encouragement,
and he should stny aloof from even peaceful settlements of foreign
4
quarrels.
Revisionism appealed to Araerica in tne t.hh·ties, be:ca.use it refiected other basic belief's then held.

The country haci.

War I by voluntary cnoice, for it had not been

,

en~crad

p~uicNJ.y

·;.Jorld

menaced.

War

twenty years later wo\lld be a. repeat of the first, with airpla.nes and
strategic lJombing, bl.lt it would remain in Ehrope.

If the country ".·:anted

to stay at peace., theref,,re, the oceans wo-.ll.d protect her i'rom attack.,
just as they always had.
An1 the

~+·,o"

ae·:tR~r.T

would. stay at peace.

As Senator Ai:thur H. Van-

denburg said, " •••We are not, we c&nnot be, the world's protector or the

world's policeman."

5

As long as the United States could import the ne-

cessary raw materials, she could

re~Jlin

aloof from the perpetual foreign

quarrels and solve her own problems, which included a depression still
unconquered.

1

The first reaction of a child of the Atomic Age to such apparent
blindness is,

11

You cannot wish an aggressor away."

Unfortunately this

lesson had to be taught by Hitler not only to America, but also to England and

Fran~e.

In 1933, United States public opinion

and

~as ~~ocketi

alar:ned by tha ruthlessness of Uazism, whicn tile people saw a5 the most
't"'\o...4-i o"

powerful form of oppression the world had ;rl!Jt produced, but tho • 11

was n3t m:are of tho daz:ger it

~:>setl.

"•b~

Amoricaryconsidered tiitler a

madman 1·1ho had victi:rl.zecl tne Geri:l<ln people, but

th~y

rest :>f the world, that he could be reasoned with.

ho-ped, au did tho

fow men realized the

lengtas to which he was willing to go, nor did they know now far Germany
would follow nim. When the events of 1938-1939 gava a clear indicntic-n
of his megalomania, A.'llericans grew even more afraid of war.

Tue foar

was not, however, that the country would be attacked, but that she

would onae again be duped into renewing her crU.l!ade for democracy, a crusade t.nat no one could pursue \dthout

~t..

Joining these beliefs was another which the cynical may say ex-

plains all of isolat.ionis:n.

Americans thougnt Britain and France, lead-

ing tl1e smaller, free European countries, could defeat the Axis, if war

finally

cam~.

On

~eptember

tb~t

13, 1933, a Gallup Poll rq:.orted

6

those questioned had fuith in the vict.ory of the dcwocracies.
later., waen Poland lay in rllins from the blitzkreig,
7
same question the same way.

71%

On·~

8G% 0 £
year

answered t.he

To place too much emphasis on the importance of this belief, however, is to ignore the facts.

bo ...... ~w

Hitler conquered sll of Europe and'!'El-

.Qaaed Britain ta Ptteel:e before the iJnited States entered the war, and if,

in 1941, anyone cherished the illusion

England could 3top the J\xis

th~t

from European do::Unation, 1t was a belief based on na inability to read
the ne\rspapers.

And yet the country dlci not intervc::ne, for isolationism

was mo:re thar:. ju3t the opinion that Germany co:.111 bo beaten.
The government which

l~d

the country shared many of these beliefs.

Througrtout the following pages references to political decisions in Washineton will na.inly concern Roosevelt's attitudes. Willia..'Il Langer and
Everett Gleason, in,~ Challenge !g Isoln.:t.ion:l9J7-1940, conri.f.m the,
popular idea that
he wnR in

th~

d~mestia.

President was as

indep~ndent

iR'forsign policy as

For r.dvice l1e tarned. to Cordell Hull, the .::acre-

tary of State, Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of State, Secretary of tho
Treasury Henry Horgenthau,Jr., Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring, and
Secret~ry

of the Navy Claude A. Swanson.

8

Hull and Welles, the most important men

; ,... ·.\.\'\.i ~
~~

study, seem to have

varied in Roosevelt's attentions, for ne was more pDrsonally drawn to
""",~
the latter and tended to snow tfti:e
favoritism, a fact which infuriated

Hull.

Whatever the personality clashes, the President did depend on

his Secretary of State, and the two did share

co~ill~n

goals and methods.

9

Tr1ese goals and ::1ethods inspired at the time considerable controversy.

A popular myth, propounded most vocally by extreme isolationists,

relate3 that Roosevelt consciously

V'lo- ... ~a.-""'

... this
,.....&)

~

country into war.

This conspiracy theory echoes revisionist wishful thinking about Wilson,
and it has little empirical backing.

'l'he President left no diary; he

was abra.ys an enig!natic figure; so one searching !or his motives must be
content with memoirs of first hand observers and with the record of the

foreign policy he

p~rsued.

·,·:r1en fie took office in 1933 :1e obviuusly concentratc:d on tl1e aew
Deal.

Later, w:1.en isolationist frenzy produced the ;foutralit;;· Act, there

10
is no evidence that he tried to block it.

Roosevelt was fresh

fro:n a landslide election; r1e later considereJ Lh<J.t mane.late sufficient
to a:;prove his packing of the Supre:ne Court.

If he disagreed with the

ideas of the legislation and yet kept silent, it was one of t.!.e few
times in his career i1e did so.
'foe evidence points to the fact that the President shared the i solationist views of his country1nen until Llie ne\'iS fro;,, Zurope convinced
him that he ha.d been wrong.

Ovi:;r tL<::: course of 1933-1939 !1c: apparently

never seriously considered sending J..rnerican truops auroa<l.

If

iit:

<li<l

plot in such a v;ay, he kept it a well guarded secret.
This paper will be an at tempt to understand how the COi.rntry reacted
to the events of the year that plunged Zurope into war.

All who read

must be cautioned against thinking in terms of facts alone.

Isolationism

was a mixture of rationality and emotion, and one simply cannot say the
country weighed what it saw as the evidence and came to the conclusion
that i t need not become involved.

The mood of the late thirties blended

with political reality an intense fear of war, a. disillusion:nent with
E'.lrope, and a faith that the
alone.

0ni~eJ

Sta.tes would be all right if left

To disregard the complexities of thto.: era's thought is to do a

disservice to the poeple who lived it.

Chapter 2
Fall, 1938
The Munich Crisis began with methods of intimidation that were to
become familiar to

A.~ericans

in the course of the next yenr.

Hitler

ranted about Czech atrocities against Germans in the Sudetenland, called
for annexation of that territory on the gounds that it rightfully belonged to his country, fomented terrorism by Nazis there, and massed
troops on the border. When war

~eemed

inevitable, Neville Chamberlain1

decided to intervene, flying to Godesburg on September 22,
with Hitler was stormy, as the

Gerrr~n

The mseting

dictator refused to make conces1

sions and de.'D.anded evacuation of the frJ.detenland by September 28.
The British Prime :·:iiuster ;naneged to convince him to set back the date
to the first or October and then returned to London to confer with his
cabinet.
Meanwhile, England sent a message to the State Decartment asking
Roosevelt for a state:nent approving Chamberlain•

•s peace

efforts.

The

President and his aides agreed that no such announcement would be made,

"

for it wo:.ild enable Britain to shift,,partial responsibility for any
2

settlement on the United States.
The next few days saw the situation in Europe grow more desperate,
and finally Roosevelt felt that he should take some action.

Accordingly,

a letter to Hitler was drafted, despite the disapproval of Hull.

The

SecretarJ of State thought force alone would change the dictator's mind,
that an appeal coQld only inflate his already magnified opinion of his

own power, and that as a result the United States would be branded an

appeaser.

3

Pierrepont Moffat, Chief of the Division of European Affairs,

had recorded in his diary as early as September 17 that top officials in
The State Department feared Chamberlaine intended to sell Czechoslovakia
4
to buy peace.
reached the crisis stage on September 26 1 Roose5
velt'" letter •re:e eeft'b. He urged negotiation, but deleted from the
~'hen the situation
~t."4 \4 t,

State Department version of the message an offer of Ur.ited States• aid
6

in reaching a settlement.

Instead, the President stressed American non-

involvement, writing, "The United States has no political entanglements.
It is caught in no mesh of hatred.
7
its civilization."
Hitler's reply repeated his
robbed in 1919.

Elements of all Europe have formed

u~ual

claims that Germany had been

Sudeten Germans were being discriminated against, and

no one could blame Germany if such atrocities forc6d her to go to war
8
for her people.
On the night of September 26,

th~

dictator renewed his violent de-

nunciations in the Sportzplatz in Berlin.

Again, Roosevelt sent a ::ies-

sage proposing negotiation, and Hull cabelled United Stc..tes diploraats to
encourage the governments with which they dealt to urge peaceful set9
tle;nent. E;urope and ~r.'.lt::rica were terrified at the threat of wc.r, but,

then, on

3e~tember

29, France, Great

Brit~in,

Italy, and

Ger~any,

confer-

,..-----.._

ring without the

c~~reached an agreement to partition tte tiny

country.

Hull exJ)ressed

the

official United States government reaction in a

press conference the next day.

"As to immediate peace results.• l ., they

they !}he terms of the settlemenfil afford a universal sense of relief 1 11
10
he said. He made no comment on those terms themselves.
Jnlike the State Department, Roosevelt initially welcomed Ml1nich as
11

the first of

r.iany

that nope long.

negotiated settlements.

On October 3, William

c.

He could not have cherished
Bullitt, ambassador to Paris,

dispatched to Hµll : . ·Q. record or a conversation with Edouard
•'

Dala~~"

" - ' - f"Q...

~o

>

president of the French Council of Ministers,. "Dala.diejf. •• realizes fully
that

~he

meeting in Munich was an immense diplomatic defeat for France

and England and recognizes that unless Frnnce can recover a united national spirit to confront the future a fetal situation will nrise within
12

the

n~t

year."

Confirming this opinion of the settlement, Secretary

of the Interior Hnrold L. Ickes wrote in his diary on October 9, "There
is a vowing impreseion that the Czechoslovak solution was a totally
disgr'!ceful thing •••• "

13

Press reaction to the Munich crisis was as uncertain as was that
in Washington.

Few observers fully grasped the true nature of Hitler's

aggressiveness, no one was certain what he wanted, and many clung to the
comforting thought that his declarations of protecting Germans were
'J',

genuine. l!!u! and Newsweek expressed the hope that the meeting had set
14

a pre:edent for future neeotiation of differences, : ..>:~·~-+tour
other
. ,/
major periodicals predicted that Hitler•s appetite hac been whette~ not
sated.

15

~ 4-.

i.kt,. the press, the A.'llerican people reacted ambivalently toward

the crisis.

The great majority thought Germany's claims were unjusti-

fied, but many also felt Britain and France took the right course in
chosing appeasement.

The same poll which yielded these results reported

that 60%

or

those· contacted felt there was now a greater possibility

t.,

war, and,

.

ct-..;i..\:is

16

or

later, the number had ollrr.bed to 74%.

As for United Stutes policy_, few wnntad Roosevelt to cdticize Hit-

ler

~nd

Mussolini during the

crisi~.

17

The vnst ;:najority thought the

o-:>untry should st!\y out or Europenn quarrels, and only about one thlrd
of those anr:wering pollcters in late o~+a.bc.r pla.c:.11d confidence ln

the Preddent's nbilit:; to avoid war wit.heat tho guarantees of stronger
18

neutrality legislation.

A significant poll reported t:1at. t:"le m.lj1Jrity

of Americans felt that. if n. ::iajor European war came, t:1a JnH.ed Stat.es
woi11d

b~

drawn into it.

19
The people had

ler• s militancy and they saw the

d11n,~er

be~ri

badly

fri3i1te~13d.

by Hit-

of 1917 loc>:n.ing again •.

Roosevelt., watching Europe sim:nar through October, was beginning
to alter his concept of the American role in •o.....
Germany.

·~onfrontation

with

On October ll)he called for $300.,0001 000 more to be spent on
20

defensq,in that fiscal year, and in a speoc:h the next day he
r
21
the need for preparedness.
The~1

strao~ed

on October 19/ Ambassador Joseph Kennedy announced ill London

)

.

that he thought the dictatorships and the democracie2 shoQld ranko a conoerted effort to work together for world peace.

Reporters in the United

States and abroad clamored to know if the speech had indicated a change
.
22
in foreign policy,
and Roosevelt was forced to go on radio a week later
to calm their fears.

Once again stressing the need for adequate defense,

the President made it abundantly clear that he planned no rapproachment

23

with the Nazis.

"There can,be no peace," he said_, "if the reign or law

is to be replaced by a recurrent sanctification or sheer force."

24

In November violence burst out again in Europe, this time producing
the strongest anti:-German reaction in the United States to date. A Po~~ l \ t.cO
llsh Jew in Paris ·filled a German diplomat, and, on November 9 and 101
., ~ "H·~~\ ':\ ..:--s4.dJ
Germany GXplod~d in bloody po:;romri and '/\legislation which deprived the
Jews of their few remaining rights.

The President's reaction wa3 more

thi~

time than n proteoting let-

At a pres9 conference November 15, he announced the recall or Am-\.o G-¢ "'" r--.o.. f'I 1.-\.
2 '5

ter.

basaarlor~H11gh

R. l'iilson for consultation.

Mr. Wilson never returned

to Berlin.

Press

public were equally horrified by the atroc:tties.

~.nd

The

pogro11s, they felt, had been del.iberately planned and exocuted by the

Hazis on tho oost obvio·1s of ;iretexts.

The

~

since the end or the Great Wn.r hna Gerr.12.ny been

Renubl.1.c wrote,, "Not
a~

hated in the United

26

StatGn ns she is todny for her current treatment of the Jews."
t.mb~ssad.or

Hans !:!. Dieckhoff 1 lry.ter recalled in retaliation for

Roose'felt' s ac"!:.i.on, re::"Jrted to Berlin th1t those A-:ierlc'\."ln who had been
unco::i':l.itted tn their

~ttitude

towar1

Germ~ny bef?~e we~e

now definitely

27
~nti-..:.'Jer:n'ln.

With

s:t~ok~d

a•1rprize he wrote 1 "Yesterday in nn: old Pro-

test.ant church in lfansach:1setts they went eo far !ls. to have a llabbi

preach for the

fir~t ti~e,

order to sho\·1 that in a

\!iCJ

departing from a 300-year-old tradition, in

situ~tion

like the present they stand l;>y the

28'

Jews. 11

Anti-German sentiment di4 not mean a change in isolationist
ment, ho\\"9ver.

senti~

The people still felt Europe was not their battleground.

Changes were coming, but

t~ey

were mail'll.y in Washington.

Chapter 3
\·iinter, l 9.3S-.39
It may have

b~en

the pogroms that finally convinced Roosevelt that

he must return to the concept of collective security; probably all the
reasons for his decision will never be
o:i him by hl.s advise?-5.

\

kn~lm.

Certainly pre3sura wa.s put

As early as September 31 cabinet members favored

aid to the democracies in

eve~wcy

po:rnible oh•Jrt

In ifovember William 6:lllltt returne1

fr,;,,....

or

~l

war.

"P~r\S. for cons'.llta-

ti.on and joined hie colle<:.gues in urging ::iov'3s to allow occ-nomic !\id to
Fr~nce.

Brit.sin and

Tne ambassador felt Europe wo:..ild be at wt.r in the

near future, which meant that even if the Unitod ;;t.'.\tes co'.lld stay ou.t,
s~e

·"''Ould be auriouely hurt by the effect on ,,;orld trade.

Britain and

France nuet be supported, for they were the only buffers protecting her
2
Hull, as !1revio·1oly stated, also considered Hitler a
from Gerir.any.
greater in·:mace ttrnn did :!toosevelt, ."nd he, to,>, felt all mon.suret; passible

5~o~ud

Thus
-e::'!: 1

bo taken to

f;-."!'

!Jr~vent ·..;a:".

the Pre:;ident had n.Jt

t~<en

'Jleac!l'n, because he sa.w no need to

i:i trie bi-electLms.

3
In rrd.d-:fo·1e:m,or,,

a ntand,

e.o~0

("&..r~'-~S
andAcec~.:.lS(! he h:d
d~cidin:; t.h~

n) longer stay coapletely aloof, he bo3an to

a

L~.. tg-r

lost so b?.dly

United

for~ulato

b•.,

~tntes

pl~n

could

to deal

wtth Hitler, for it, was obvious to him by then that words were not

enough.

Jn Novembor 10, he ·..1rote in a private ldtter,

friends must begin to fish or cut bait.

was

before."

0ur British

The dictator threat from Europo

is a good deal aloser to the United States and tne
-\-lr\. t\_.,\'\
4
~it

11

America~

Continent

Roosevelt chose to return the country to the system of collective
security which she had abandoned in the mid-thirties.

The President

would continUB to use all his powers of persuasion to maintain peace in

europe, but if such efforts failed, America must be ready to stand beni.nd Britain and Franoe economically.

Roosevelt still believed that the
5
clemocracies could defeat the Axis if they were properly supplied.
During the last two months of 1938, the President
+o

'SCLl\d) -+-Co~,..~

gramA~for

w \...\ ~ "'""o.__\~

~\ \

cia..1.>)~G:.&

a pro-

a bulld-up in the sise of the armed forces and in arms

production for hemispheric defense.

His goas appear:)to have been three-

6
fold: (1) he wanted the United States to be prepared for any eventuality;
~2)

he wanted to have munitions to sell to the democracies; (3) he wa.i-

ted Hitler to be assured that American aid would be more than mere moral
support.
Three obstacles to the realization of his goals confronted the President.

First there were the pBople, second, the extreme isolationists in

Congress, and thirs, the Neutrality Act.

The presence of the arms em-

bargo and the absence of the cash and carry provision (It was due to expire May 1.) would block any atte:npt to aid Britain and France if they
went to war.

To have these sections of the Act changed, Roosevelt

would have to break down the resistance both on and off Capitol Hill.
On January 41 he delivered the'State of the Union Message!' to Congress, and in it 'ht. ·c:.o..Uedl for reviews ot existing neutrality legis-

7

lation and of the means tor hemispheric defense.

a

11 •••

The l«>rld has

grown so small," the President said, " ••• that no nation can be safe •••
so long as any other powerful nation refuses to settle its grievances
9
at the council table."

Definite proposals followt!d in other ziessages sent to Congress in
January.

The first called for preparations for i1er.listiheric de.f t!nse in

the form of stronger air forces, stockpiles of i te;;is

rer~uirint:;

a long

ti:ne to manufacture and of scare goods v;hic:1 had to be imported, improve:nents in coastal defenses, and better fortifications to prott:lct the

10

11

Canal Zone.

The second requested appropriations to expand the l.ir Force.

In response to these proposals, isolativnists sprang to their feet,
bitterly protesting any change in neutrality legislation.

Then came two

incidents whicn they could, and did use, to h:igh advc:ntd.ge.

lin January 23,

a bomber on a tr<.iining mission crashed in California, and the nev;s got to
the press that a French official had bt:en on board.

Isolationists all

wer the coJ.ntry scree.med their objections to such a securit.y violo.tion
and forced Roosevt:lt to ad1ait four days later t..ilat rie liad secretly
authorized the sale of ple:.nes to Fr&:1;e.
The President then ca:l_led the

:~u tar~·

House to soothe its -r~f..fled feathers.
to the press t:-.at Roosevelt had said,

Affairs

Co:~..:ni ttee

to the ·,foite

After the :r1et:ting tb.f.f-.,story leakt:d
11

The American frontier is on the

12
Rhine."

Again t!'-.e isolE.tionists seethed, and Senator ;.;ye led t:-,e chorus

of opposition by refusing to attend the :-:ilite.ry J.ffairs Cor:i:nittt:::e mt.::etings

13
until their procedure \'las raade public.
·;:-nether the peo;:ile ree.cted as violently e:.s

Con~rees

is doubt.t::u.l, but

t'."le President felt he had to anewer his critics; so, on February J, he.
called a press conference to restate his postioi:i.

Roosevelt denied flatly

that he had ever made the sta ter:1ent about the .:1.hi.ne, labelling the story

14
a "deliberate lie."

The govern:nent stood for four principles in foreign

policy: (1) free -world tra;de; (2) no entangling alliances; (J) Jisarrr;ament;

t.4..a

freedom.

He had not, nor wo:..lid he ever, depart fro;;i the traditional

position of the

~nited

State$.

15

The announcement was designed to calm the public, not to appease
Congress, for Roonevelt rarely conferred with Congressionnl leaders on
foreign policy.

He seems to have thought,

~~th

conniderablc justificn-

tion, that little could bo gained by trying to plncate the extreme isolationiats, and moGt of his appeals for support of Britnin and France

16
were directed at the people.
The press reacted to these incidftnts with apprehension.

They saw

the ?resident's moves as attempts to frighten Hitler, as well as measures to insure adequate defense.

Defense was important, but few felt

the dictator would pay much attention to United States• action, and
all concurred in believing that he was not satisfied, but only waiting.
Public reaction was much the same.

From the three month vantage

point, most Americans still saw l'.unioh as the best that could have been
done with a bad situation.

A poll reported that 49.2% of those

ques~

tioned blamed the crisis on Hitler's lust for power and 24% on Germa:ny•a
need for raw materials.

17

The majority thought, as it had in September,(a•L

C..~p+

that if there should be a European war the United States would be drawn

lS

in.

Another poll revealed that 56%

or

those contacted felt the demo-

cracies, including America, should stop Hitler from taking any more ter-

19
ritory,

~
O,.;ii;

but then Hitler had not moved for three months.

Unlike the more violent isolationists in Congress, most of the
American people agreed with Roosevelt's rearmament proposals, 86% sup:ZD
porting a larger navy, 82% a larger army, and 90% a larger air force.
A majority, although smaller, also favored the sale of planes to France
21
on a cash and carry basis.
Americans in January, 1939, a period of

f" ·

"4

relative ceJ.CT, temporarily forgot the stories of tho devilish munitions
maker::; and bec:ir:e more pro-Allies as they grew more anti-,A1xis.

The old fears were still there, howevor, and Roosevelt knew it.
Ickes records in his diary a lunch conversation l:ith the Pre3idont,
Roosevelt said that if iiitlcr gained control of the s:nnll.

January 28.

S-:.iropea."1 countries only, he could .otill endanger the United Sta.tea eco-

nomically.

ickee,

~re

of an interventionist that the Chief Executive,

replied that the people should be told.

"He \liooseveltj said that it

woald be absolutely impossible for him or for me to go on the air and
talk to the World [si~ as we were talking.

22
believe him."

The peoplo simply would not

Chnpter 4.
Spring, 19.39

ThrouGhout Februnry the isolntionictc continued to scre3r.l in Congress nnd ln the r.cwa ncdic., but Roocevelt

on reports from

nbro~d.

ignor~d

thc:-:1 and concentrated

In lntc Jnnunry rumors came that Hitler would
1

move by the end of tho next month agoinst ifostern Europe,
quently the news grew m:>re cheerful.
Pol~.nd,

but suboo-

Anthony J, Biddlu, ambnsnador to

wrote thn.t that ecvement .felt tho d.i..ctntor would t.urn h:tB at2

tention to the colonies lost in the Pence of Veronillos.

Kennedy's

d11Jpatches reported that Chnrr.berlain/ thought Hitler w:mld tRke no action,

that n Russo-German pact

unlikely, and thnt any crisis which aro!3e
3
could be dealt with peacefully. Even the dispatches sent from Berlin
wa::;

/

by At tache Trilillan Smith were optimistic.

One note of M1at should havo bean
Washington.

4

tal~en

a.a a warning did come to

Oi 1.,_~~ ...'

l""Q..~

Prentiss Gilbert, chargl'(in Ger:nany, wrote on February 24

that nny and all action depended on Hitlor'e will, which was notoriously
5
h!ird to predict.
Soon thereafter, the dictator proved the correctness

or

the Acerican'a estimation and shattered government optimism.
On March 13, Berlin newspapers once more carried stories of Czech

atrocities against Germans,

The same day Bullitt reported that Hitler

planned to move first on Czechoslovakia and then on Rwnania, and that
6
Brita.in and France were doing nothing,
Raymond H. Geist, the new charge'~~«-~
in Berlin, confirmed this dismal !orecast, writing the same day that an
attack on the diS!'Ilembered neighbor was definite.

7

That day Czech President Emil Hacha met with Hitler. He was con'
pletely helpless before the d•ctator,
German troops crossed the border,

.

an~

on March

l~

Hitler entered Prague.

Roosevelt was furious.

a

He had not trusted the Austrian before,

but neither had he expected aggression to be so blatant, so swift, and so
easy.

Sumner Welles levelled a stinging attack on the final rape or

Czechoslovakia two days later, saying, "It is manifest that acts of wanton lawlessness and or arbitrary force are threatening world peace and
9
the very structure or modern vivillzation. 11
~~~,

Roosevelt had been debating since

February whether he should return Ambassador Wilson to Berlin.

The

strain in relations with Germany had seemed to be easing, but the President feared the effect the action :night have on American public opinion and on Hitler's estimation or United States• resolve to aid Britain
10
and France.
By March 13 he had decided to send Wilson back, tor the
~~~~~
ll
diplomat was anxious to go. On .?I.arch l~f\all such plans were cancelled.

..

l~H -t""O,_._"tS) \,.., \-"'
-Motta~

also speculated that Roosevelt was considering a complete

diplomatic break with Germany.

He rejected, however, suggestions from

Bullitt that he soundly renounce Hitler's action and go personally to
12
Congress to call for repeal of the Neutrality Act.
At a cabinet meeting the seventeenth, Roosevelt presented his program
or reprisals.

The United States government would refuse to recognize

the protectorate Hitler had set up in Prague.

Countervailing duties

would finally be levied against Germany in retaliation for taJCes it had
already put on American goods, and the special privileges which had been

granted to impi;>rts

fro~

Czechoslovakia were revoked.

The press, as outraged as the government at

13

Hitl~r's

actiun, de-

clared that the dictator had finally revealed his true nature.

Some

periodicals expressed surprise, some said it was to be expected, but all
agreed that any pretense of righting the wrongs done to German minorities
was ridiculous.

The march into Czechoslovakia should teach all who

watched that Germany was capable of unlimited rapacity and treachery.
Among most Americans, the reaction was the same.

The German dhargb

d' affaires in lfashington, Hans Thomsen, reported that the f;i.lblic felt Hitler was never again to be trusted and that his desires for conquest were
not yet sated.

14

In the minds of most men, the dictator had come to re-

present an enemy of every value they cherished.
0"

Yet still the aloofness remained.

~ielles

k

14.

,..c.L.,. l -;

telephoned Bullitt/\ and,

when summing up the American attitude toward the aggression, reflected,
"It is a reaction to sor:1ething horrifying and shoc!dng, but not personally connected •••• "

15

An incident in late February illustrates the

strength~of

,msn feeling in America when the ifazis acted closer to ho:ne.
ton's birthday a rally of 20,000 members of the
held at Hadison Square Garden.

ant.:i:.:QerOn ·,:ashing-

German~Arr.eric~n

Dund was

Police stood guard in l.:.rge numbers, but,

even so, violent demonstrations against the ffibclting occurred in the
streets surrounding the auditorium.

The German consul general in Hew

York, Borchers, wrote to Berlin that

A~ericans

saw the bund as an at-

tempt to weaken the country from within, and he urged his government to

16
dissociate itself from the organization.
Throughout the year now under consideration, the Nazi organization
drew little attention in press and polls; so one can assume the people

generally disregarded iL.

J.. rall;.,- on ',-iasl1ington 1 s birthday, however,

garbed in all the respectibility of trauitional Americo.n patriotism, was
a~parently

more than

~-Jew

Yorkers could tolerate.

When. vit:·.\ring Bitler

from a safe distance, their hatred of him could b1::: detached, but ifazi
activity in their own country disgusted, inc-.;nsed, and perh.:..ps tlV<:::u
frightened thern.
:fows from Europe in tile wet::ks follm'iini:; the seizure of Czechoslovakia contin'..led to dominate the front pages.

On !·Iarch 23, Lithuania,

under pressure, ceded the seaport of :-:emel to Ger;11any.

A week la ttir

Britain and France announced unqualified support of Poland.

On April

7,

r.:ussolini marched on :..1bania.
The reports pouring into the State Depart•Hent wtlre even more alarming.

Geist wrot.e from Eerlln that no om: could prt::c.iict 1-1;1=.1t wou:::..u ila}J-

p.:ln next.

The

Germ~ms

hac.l a sense of mission, lie felt., wi1ich rnd.c.ie t.l1cir

aggressiveness ff.ore than just a drive for lC1nd.

T111::: ut::xt H1oves vwulc.l Le

17
eastward, and no a:uount of appease;at:::nt would have an;y bt::n1:::flcial 1:::fft::ct.
Roosevelt. decided d.t this point to make anot.;1er attempt at talking
Hitler into p1:::ace.

':ii1en he told null of :1is plan to send a :i<t::ssag1::: to

the dictator, the Secretary of State said he clid not t;1ink it vmuld l1ave
any positive results.

He was still afrd.i<.l such letters would brand the

.

United States an appeaser and thereby hurt J.rnerican chances of influencing

,
Hitler in future cf'.isefl.

Roosevelt agreed that the likelihood of success

was small, but that at least all blame for war would be laid directly on

13
the Axis.

Accordingly, the "Saturday

~urprize" \Ja~

sent. to Hitler and Musso-

lini on April 14. Proposing n European conterenco to settle i:uropean
problems, it also called on the Axis powers to make an
of policy, which Roosevelt

~'Ould

hon~ot

statement

co1m1unicate to other world leaders.

There followed a list of 31 European and Uear Eastern countries which
they wore to prowiso not to attack for at least ten years, preferably not
for 25.

Finally, Roosevelt called for nn international conference con-

cerning disarmament and world trade which the United States would attend.
To dispel any isolationist fears, the President held a press conference the next day.

He stressed the fact that his proffered role was

intermediary, not mediatoi; and that the United States would dit>cuss in
conference only trade and disarmament, two issues about which she had
20
always been willing to talk.
The offer, regardless of Roosevelt's statements to the contrary,

was a departure from the withdrawal of the last four years, but Americans, possibly welcoming any attempt to

re~toro

calm, reacted favorably,

21
although few thought it would have any effect.

Then the7 waited tor

the reply'.

Mussolini 1 s answer came in a speech denouncing Roosevelt on April 20.
Little attention was paid to him, however, for everyone knew his German
master would give the real Axis answer.

Bullitt reported that Hitler was angry that Roosevelt had f:elt
called upon to meddle in Europe, but that he thought he must make some
22
reply to such a direct challenge.
It came in the Reichstag speech of
April 28.

The Austrian was in a devastatingly sarcastic mood, and, after

reiterating f:oz>.tibc t<ft: iz=•M.th atiime his justification of German actionts

19

thus far and his new demands on Poland, he launcned into his answer to
Roosevelt.

He repeated the appeals of the Americo.n, twisted in ludi-

crous fashion, and then prefaced each robuttal with a clipped,

11

Answer1 11

which convulsed the Nazis before him.
Europe could settle its problems

bott~r,

he said, if those not in-

volved would stay at home and tend to their own affairs.

Tho

unit~d

Stntes was calling for an international conference, and yet Hitler remeobered that, at the international conference at

Ve~sailles,

America

had done nothing to prevent the rape of Germany.

In reply to the Presi-

dent's list of countries not to be attacked, the Austrian said he had
contacted all of them nnd none felt threatened, but if they requested a
guarantee of safety, he would certainly be more than nappy to give it.
Drawing the speech to a close, Hitler, always an actor par excellence, said ha'I!bly,

"Mr.

Roosevelt!

I fully understand that the v•st-

ness of your nation and the immense wealth of your country allows you to
~,

-gee!

.

responsible for the history of the whole world ••••

I, sir, am

23
placed in a much more modest and smaller sphere."
painted a picture or hie role ae savior of Germany.

He then, modestly,
24

Roosevelt was probably tu.rious, but there was nothing he could do.
His offer had been ridiculed out of existence.

Perhaps he found comfort

in the fact that his punpose of laying blame on the Axis for any war to
come

~~uld

be fulfilled and that his message had placed the United States

25
firmly in the position of opposing all future aggression.
Public reaction to the Reichstag speech was divided.

Moderates

thoueht it closed the door on any chance of peace; some isolationists

saw a glimmer of hope in what they thought was a requeat for definite

26

peace proposals.

Those ieolationists who were not so optimistic felt

the dictator's intransigence was even more reason for etaying uninvolved.

27
~·f.eanwhile;ths

attitude toward nid to Europe had been changing.

As

the country became more anti-Ger.:nan, it gl'ew more willing to give eco-

28
When e.i;ked to list the most

nomic help to the democr!l.oies.

problems before the United States, however, those polled

pre~dng

n~~ed,

in or-

der 0£ importance: (1) ata.y5.ng out of war; (2) solving unemployment;

(3) recovery for businens.

29

The old fear of being drawn in was still

paramount, and the people had little faith in the ?reoident'a actions'
30
.having any effect on Europe.

Dy the end of April, some hope that Europe would be able to solve
her own problems began

to,~grow,

an optimism which would increase with

the co:ning of summer.

1'hroughout the year in question, proepecte £eemed

brighter when Hitler lapsed into relative inactivity, as he did in those
montha.

Men could more easily remember the horror of war tnan the terror

in Germany.

Chapter 5
Summer, 1939
T'ne summer or 1939 in Europe was an endless diplomatic maze or
frantic activity over Danzig; in the United Stntes it was marked by peesimism in Washington and optimism in the rest of the country.
Information pouring into the capital gave Roosevelt and his advisers
!.n

accurate view of the situation abroad, for, in addition to able work

by the diplomatic service's regular channels, there were leaks in the
1

Jerman Foreign Office which supplied valuable reports.
feeling prevailed that war was lees likely;

In rrl.d-May the

Britain anti France were
2

building alliances and Germany had economic troubles.

Then came the

old familiar pattern or Nazi-arranged uprisings of Germans, this time
in the free port of Danzig, as Hitler renewed his demands for occupation
ot that city and access to it through the Polish Corridor.
began

p~edicting

Soon diplomats

a m:>ve before the end of the su.amer.

By P.ay Roosevelt had long since abandoned any faith in appeasement,

1

and Britain and France finally seemed determined to stand firm; so the
.President turned his attention to revision of the Neutrality Act in the
hope that such action would assure Hitler of American ability and intention to aid the Allies.

Although at that time non-violent solutions

still seemed possible, the Chief Executive felt any steps that would
further increase the probability of peace must be taken.
On May 1, the cash and carry provision had expired.

Roosevelt had

entrusted renewal of it and revision of the Act to Senator Key Pittman,

chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, but he had been bungling the
task since March, and in early 1-!ay he reported that passage was unlikely.

3

The President, therefore, chose Sol Bloom, chairman of the House Foreign
Relations Committee, to introduce a new, even stroneer bill there.

It

called for repeal of the ar:ns etcl>a.rgo and rene-.:al of cash and carry, but
it also gave the president the power to name an aggressor in a conflict
4
The bill was reported out of col':'Jilittee
and levy sanctions accordingly.
favorably, but the vote was purely along party lines.

5

The real .fight

lay on the House tloor.
Hull then wrote a letter to

Pitt~an

E 1Vernment

'rhu United States was now too big -for .'' -

reasons for asking for the changoo.

+~..., <l- " 0 ...~ c. c:.J.fiGt,-t,o-atf-eot the rest of

and Bloom stRtine

o...c;;..""Hv

C) "

the world.

The aim of its foreign policy,

snid the Secretary, must be :nnximum aecurity coupled with attitudes and

6
actions which would discourage war.
In a conversation with Senate Republican leader Charles L. McNary
before the introduction of the Bloom Bill, Hull asked his estimation of
the chances for repeal of the arms em.b&rgo.

The seasoned politician re-

plied, " ••• I guess you will be in for considerable trouble if you press
repeal •••• .:Oo~e people feel pretty strongly, and =ioot of the rest don't
7
want to do anything now. 11
McNary' a analysis proved correct not only of
the embargo, but of oash and carry as ·well.
One pleasant incident drew attention away from Cor1gresoional h3ggling in early June.

King George VI and

to Canada, came to Washington.

~uenn

Zlizabeth, after a visit

Ure. Roosevelt \'Tote that the President

considered England America's "first line of defense," so that he planned
8
the trip to rally public suppobt.
The presence of royalty in the White

House caused considerable consternation over protocol;

Bullitt even

sent the First Lady a detailed, secret memorandum recording the proper
9
way to receive a king and queen.
Despite much strain for the professi.onal worriers and an unusually severe heat wave, the visit was a euccess, and the royal couple captivated everyone.
The isolationists in the House reclaimed the

Kr~

~""" .. L"

stage~George and~liza-

beth vacated, and if they were not as charming, they were considerably
more vocal, as they rose to protest each major section of the Bloom Bill.
The arms embargo and non-renewal of cash and carry were necessary, they
felt, to protect this country from foreign involvement.

The opposition

pointed out that refusal to sell would directly aid the Axis, since Britain, controlling the seas, would be the only country capable of buying
rrom the United States.

Representative Hamilton Fish replied that neu10

trality meant:.playing no part in a war. If the United States acted to
"'-t-1 p
.
-hwlp. the Allies by repealing the embargo, it would be "endeavoring to
11
take sides before war is declared."
Supporters of Roosevelt's position tried to point out the inconsistency of the isolationist position by saying that trade in other commodities was as necessary to maintain an army as munitions, and yet the
objection was just to dealing in munitions.

Fish answered that anyone

who wanted to engage in commerce with belligerents would do so at his
own risk, with the government taking no aotion when his goods were des12

troyed at sea.
Perhaps the II¥lSt bitterly protested point of the bill was the new
passage which er.ipowered Roosevelt to name and then levy sanctions
against an aggressor.

The isolationists freely admitted that they did

not truet the Chief Executive; Representative George H. Tinkham branded
the Bloom proposnls 11 a bill for war at the pleasure of the president."
~le

13

and his colleagues felt Roosevelt had dangerounly interventionist

viewe, and if he we:-e given

s~c::i

power he Wullld, by labellins one nation

responsible for a war, prepare the way for the United States to be

cJ f'rttvh
~a

in on the ot!1er side of the quarrel,
In resistance to the bill., all the old, fa.tlliar arguments were

brought out, and in final defense so:ne men even voiced assurances that.
peace would la.st.

R~presentative

;ar1 T, Curtis, after damning the

rawrl.tlons makers as warcont;ers, said cal.ml.y, "T'ne people
t.rie::; are all good people.
the govern:nenta. 11

It iu the people i·:ho

.~sht

or

",hose

coun-

the w.:irs, not

~

R~pres~ntativo Edouard ?J.H. Izac :r..i:nmed up ieolationist reasons for
"

oppooi:ig any ohange in exiJting neatrallty legislation by saying, "You
must uctually put an iron ring around the ':iestern He:nisphere a.nd keep
ev~rybody

out of there, but it cannot bo dono according to international

)$.

law. 11
T'no Bloom Bill passed
mencblu~ts

J;.iue

301 but it had been Emaf3culated by am-

which deleted the renowal of cash and carry, denied Roosevelt's
l.r.6

power to name an aggressor, and restored the nrma e:nbargo.

Senate, for it was shelved July 13 by the
11:
Conrnittee on a vote of 12 to 11.

even reach the floor of

Foreign

Relati~ns

It did not

t~e

The isolationists• reasons for

r~jecti.::..; th~

bill were a :nixture

of their old foars, partizans!up, distrust o! the President, and a genu-

ine feeling that there would b3 no war before
Congress remained largely

apat~etic

Jan~ary.

The majority of

and allowed the minority to have its

way. and Roosevelt

hi~self

bunglad his role.

Tne President did not pllsri for passage wi t.!1 his typical fervor until it was too late, because, sorr.e feel, he was afraid of showlng t.l1e

13
world how strong isolationist sentiment really was.
had died, as reports from i::urope becn.m8 :..v~
fused to give up the fight.

•.;

.After the bill

and more alarming, he re-

Dllllitt wrot..e in ln.Le June that a ci'isis ,,.;as

likely as soon a.s the Ger!f,an ar.7JY finished it 1aanuvers in July.

19
troops had already begun infiltrating Danzig.

German

Anthony J. Biddle dis-

oatched fro~ Foland on July 12 the re.Dort that a peaceful settlement
.
20
was doubtful.

On July 141 Roosevolt ::;cnt a oessage to Gong!·e::;s urging

pa.~rn:ige,

and tour days lnter ho cmlled Soruitorit.l. loaders to the \ihite House to
convince tha.l'. to chang;:, their vote.

Senator ':lillia.m

.s.

Borah proceeded

to infuriate Hill, reportedly-bringing tears of rage to his eyes, by
22
ing tnat his dOi.lrCilO in Zuropv did not pred.ict war.

~ay-

m.o:ioirs al.moot ton ydars later, the Secretary was stlll angry at thia
elur on the work

or

the diplomatic service, and ha said sarcautically

23

that Bora.'1 • s source was a minor pross ser.o.:.c..: in London.

Hull closed the

chapter uith these v-.-orcis:
Trying to wln over the ~solationist.s was for wo
a nerve-racking and back-breaking experience.
As I looked at. the isolationists ••• , they raminded me of the somnambulist who walks within an
inon of a tho~sand-foot precipice without batting an eye. 24

On July 21, Roosevelt held a press Conference, and, when the quea-

tion of neutrality legislation was raised, the Presidont sa.id that the
Senate must take the bllin:.e for not acting.

Europe would go to war in

the

irr~':lediate

future; to shelve the bill had been to declare to hi::1 tnat

25
it was inevitable.
Roosevelt and Hull thought that Hitler would be encouraged by' the
refusal to act, both because Brita.in and France could not buy from the
United States and because the country had shown an unwillineness to
stand behind them.

Samuel I. Rosenman, a close associate of the Pres-

dent's for many years, wrote,

"~lthough

he denied it specifically, I

know from what he said frequently that he did feel a great deal of bitterness at the frustration of one of his last and best hopes for ,:.-.e.:i.ce. 11
iihether this r1ope in the power of iunerican actions over Germany was
justified is doubtful.

iiull wrote that diplorr,a.ts told him rejection or

2.7
the act would encourage :IiLler.

"dilliam L. Si1irer, correspondo.nt in

Berlin, conv<::rsely said t.hot he

m~ver

he.ti any indication that s\.U11JHer tLat

211
3err:i.a.n officic.ls paid any attention to tht: Unit.ed .Jtates.
derson, British ambassador, J.ot::::i not even mention the event in his record

29
of his mission.

~vi<leuce

points to ti1e fact that riitler i1d<l alreauy

made his plan:; when the Sew:..te refused to act.

In i·:a.y i1e had told a

group of his generals that the cletermination to ::iecure iJanzii; wuulc.l mean
\;ar, out tirn.t it was a risk wi1ich must be taken to fulfill Gerr11any' s

30
Lebensrau.rn.
In late :-:ay German

Charg~

d' affa.ir<::s Thomsen, esti:natine ;..merica' s

attitudes and military strength, wrote ti1cit t!1e country did not want to
fight abroad, but that Roosevelt was trying to stir up the people.

Al-

though he habitally oversta:..ed the President's power and bis natrer..i of
Germany, he rightly felt that no IJ.ilitary aid could be sent to Eur9pe for

31
some time.

32
T'nomsen ha.d held this view since at least !·:arch,

and he main-

33

ta.ined it through the rest of the

sum~er.

couraged nitle

Gon£res~ional

ar morP than any

S:1ch reports probably en-

stuooornoss,

f he paid

attention to the ~ni~ed ~tates at all:)
Pre~s

reaction to the rejection of the neutrnlity ler,islation varied.

Some periodicals thoURht it bad;

said it rrnde no difference.

eo~e

correctly judged that the reasons for

shelvin~

were portizanr.hip, dis-

trust of Roosevelt, enc irolntiorism, with the latter
ouently named.
s~ect~

Unlike the

Con~ressmen,

for pence in Eurone were

~owinG

bein~

the journnlistr.

the most fre-

thou~ht

the pro-

rliYlr.!er by the dny.

The neople, however, 21nw hone i.n the future.
those polled thour,ht there would be a

They

Eur~pean

In

Janu~ry,

41._'f; of

war within the year.

With the Czech cr1sis the fieure roce to 51%, but by t':'.\y 1 t h:1d dro:pped

to

J~,

and July

S~W

rt down to

2J~.

34

Still, a lnrre rr.ajority

fidence in the abi 11ty of Br:f.tP.in, Friince,

if

nee~

sary.

35

The Allies hed ftnqlly

people felt Hitler

wo~ld

~

t~~en

RilSsia to

a firm

mont~e.

con-

defeat the Axis,

~tand,

~nd

now thin'c twice before provoking war.

all, he had been quiet for four

h~d

the
After

Chapter 6
War, 1939
Roosevelt and Hull knew Europe was far from peace.

As the possi-

bility or war loomed larger, the President focused his attention on the
alliance negotiations between Britain, France, and the USSR.

He did

not like Stalin, but he was tolerant of him and he considered his aid
1

necessary if the Allies were to stop Hitler;

so in late

July

he again

took the course or written persuaatbn·;; ...

A top secret message was cabled to Paris and carried from there to
Ambassador Lawrence Steinhardt in Moscow by courier.

Roosevelt urged

Stalin to unite with Britain and France, but declared that he could do
nothing about the terms or an alliance.

'lbe sending of the letter was

2

to be kept secret.
Steinhardt wrote back to Hull that Moscow's leader was mainly concerned about the rising menace or Japan.
would have to

go

through Poland

and

If Hitler turned on Russia, he

Rumania tirst, and, Stalin reasoned,

such action would bring a declaration of war from Britain and France.

3

Meanwhile, gloomy reports poured into Washington r1•om abroad.
Pierrepont Moffat predicted on August 2 that Ge~ would move by the
4
&'o-~\n..s
end or the month.
Alexander c. Kirk, oharg,1'4-n Berlin, "'Tote six days
later that Hitler would act by mid-September, and the Americ§n echoed
the confusion ot diplomats forced to deal with a government completely
dominated by such an enigmatic, volatile man.

s

With Hitler applying pressure to Poland in the manner by now so

familiar, Roosevelt prepared for war.
P, &. r ~~ S

A. ~CL I'\ ""-\

Lan:ge1 end Gleason :f'eei rie acted

l'\C..

slowly, the~ revealing -hW"'reluctanoe to admit that little hope was
6
left.
On August 4, the War Resources Board was set up to administer
neutrality, and $10,0001 000 became available to build stockpiles.
Two days· later Welles instructed Biddle to tell Jo sir Beck, Polish
foreign minister, that Poland must not make the first l'lX>Ve, lest she be
branded an aggressor.

7

Bullitt reported on August 11 that French lea8
ders felt that a "crisis [could come] in any 24 hours."
For the last two weeks of the month the wires to Washington screamed

warnings"'from Europe.

Kirk reported in a handwritten message that Hitler
9
was not r.onvinced that Britain and France would stand firm;
Daladier
10

told Bullitt the attack would come in eight days;

Bullitt wrote that

11
~he

French !or the first time saw no hope.
Then, August 24, the non-aggression pact between Russia and Ger-

many was signed.

Roosevelt, rushing back to Washington from a fishing

trip oft Canada, hoped that Spain, Italy, and Japan would bo disillu12
sioned, but he also teared the appeasing tendencies of the Allies.
Opinion in the State Bepartment varied over the full effect of Germany's
diplomatic triumpp, but no one f alt cheerful.

13

Once again messages were sent, this time to Hitler, Victor Emmanuel,
the king of Italy, and Ignace Moszicld., president of Poland.

Roosevelt

proposed negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration, with his role that
14
or intermediary.
Moffat wrote in his diary that everyone knew the attempt was doomed, but that the message had to be sent.

,,

,, ••• Any chance

sould be taken and above all ••• the record should be abundantly clear,"

he said.

lS

Two days earlier, on August 22, he had set the odds !or

peace at 7S to 25.

16

The country was stunned by the announcement or the pact. For years
Nazis had screamed foul epithets at communismJ now they united with it
and the two g1ante ot Europe joined in a manmoth war machine.

The press

cried that the announcement marktld a disaster. War seemed inevitable.
The public reacted with the same shocked contueion, as no one
seemed to know what would happen.

The old hatred of Communism flared

up again. Everyone felt the dictatore had proved their natural treache17' and had given the United States even greater reaeon for doing its
utmost to avoid entanglement.
On August

17

25, Roosevelt held a cabinet meeting to announce the emer-

gency measuree he had taken.

The Treasury Department would require

clearance tor all toreighnships in American ports.

It war came, ha would

urge the departments ot State and Justice to delay the neutrality declaration, au that as JDJlah arms and equipment as possible could be got
18

to Britain and France.

In a press conterence the same day, Roosevelt

said war was not certain, but his optimism must have been based more on
hope than tacts.

19

The ?resident and the State

De~~r~ment

correctly thought that there

wo•.ild be no rapproachment this time, because Poland seemed determined to
stand firm, assured that Britain and France would be forced to support
her.
Tne

So desperate was Chamberlain that he told Kennedy to suggest to
~nited

States that it put pressure on the Poles to back down, but

t:ashington scornfully rejected the idea.

20

The last day or the month Hitler sent his reply to the President's
peace message, and its complete denial of any German g1.rl.lt for the crisis
:21

snuffed out hope that

A.~erica co~ld

feeling in Washington when he wrote,

help avert war.

Moffat swnmed up

fhe ~last two days ~ugust 26 and

2i}

have given me the feeling of sitting in a house where somebody is dying
upstairs.

There is relatively little to do and yet the suspense con22
tinues unabated."
The next press conference at the White House convened to hear Roose-

velt announce the invasion of Poland on September 1.
question

or whether

In anBWer to the

the United States could stay out of war, the Presi-

23

dent said, " ••• I not only sincerely hope so, but I believe we can. 11
Two tlays later he repeated ttds assurance in a "fireeide chat'; ~ adding
1

to the original draft of the speech his opinion that Americans could not
be expected to rer.iain neutral in thought as well ae in deed.

24

War had

only strengthened his resolve to rally American support for the Allies.
On September 8 the Presitlent declared the neutrality of the United
~ 0 t"\
,+c.._., b c.r t 3

States.

"°

Congress was ce1led into special session,to repeal the arms

embargo, which the !:J.8jority now consented to do, and the bill became law
on Noverr.ber 4.

cv..c..a.. _, 'ai-~
Roosevelt's reacto.& 1 to the end of ea y;eM" ef it1:!"8f'ean blandex s
nm:s~

save

~••R

a

~·ill'•

o' sorrow and foreboding.

He had spent that

year trying to convince leaders abroad to confer over their differences,
and all the effort had been wasted.
Once again attention must be turned to the idea that Roosevelt

~ pA:rt.t\4- I 1 ._s \ a..+c.. o..~
plannecl for United States intervention. ,._f. 1 September,, :b&nge!'-&nd-Gl:e&'eoft

fe~l he honestly thought the ~...+1~ could stay 011t of actual con25

nict, while supplying Britain and France economically.

Hull says, al-

though writing trom a vnhtage point or almost ten years, that he and the
26 .\2..o ~L r-\Preside~lt always worked to avoid entanglement.
·Roget"t- !Jherwood,, one ot
Roosevelt's ghost writers, advances the thesis that the Chief Executive's
reaction to the outbreak of the war was an underestimation or German
power

a~d

a fenr or appeaserr.ent by the Allies that would allow Hitler

to ream, rally the support or his people and partners, and play on isolationist sentiment in the \-lest.

2!7

Mrs. Roosevelt writes that her hus-

band never thought war was inescapable and that he continually said he
28

hoped that, if it came, the United States could stay out.
If these close observero nre wrong,, if Roosovelt really

h~rbored

a desire to eend American troops abroad,, the fact remains that from September,, 1939 to December, 1941, all he af>ked for wns economic aid to
+o +~t- A- l \ l u lo l ..... +
the Allies. T·~G.... L\:!i.~0"1..1&. t...lust..r:/\ did not ento~ the war
until she.-vaa attacked.
Press and public reaction to the invasion or Poland are easier
to see.

The press thought Britain and France would be the winners or a

war fought in trenches.

A stalemate would develop, with Britain con-

trolling.the seas and France holding Germany at the Maginot Line.

No

one understood Hitler's blitzkreig or foresaw the brillance of his untactics.

conventi~nal

~s;for

on the

29

the United States,, it could stay out, and the preGs agreed

o~urse

the country should take.

The neutrality laws should be

enforced, after having :Ce stored cash and carry.

The government should

act to prevent the growth or belligerent credit here.

Above all, Amari-

cans must remember World War I, and they must trµly want to remain tm-

involved.

30

The people shared these views,

They blamed Hitler fully for pro-

voking the war, and thought Britain and France had been right in standOn August 17,

ing firm.
to give in.

31

on~

12% of those questioned wanted the Allies

In mid-September, 73% answering pollsters believed Eng-

land and France should stand by Poland.
country in ruins,

79%

32

On&

~onth

later, with that

polled thought the Allies ehould remain at war.

33

The year since l'.unich had taught Americans that appeasement would not
work.

Like the press, the people believed Germany would lose.
October,

64%

In early

of those polled favored Britain and France; two weeks later

the tigure had risen to 71.%.

Of those answering in such a manner, 62%

said they were very confident of an Allied victory.

34

America could stay out if she wanted, but she must make a concerted
errort to do so.

""'",-()""'
~"+ "'-~~ -~~s;-4Orie-observep wrote, 11We are as'a~il.ation

undoubtedly

suffering trom a psychosis, a .tear that. we shall be trapped into war in
wpite or ourselves."

35

The polls revealed that Amerioane still felt the

entrance into World War I had been a mistake,

36

The majority believed

Roosevelt should remain aloof from the crisis and concentrate on keeping
the country uninvolved.

37

As tor the policy he should pursue, a Roper poll reported that
Only 37.5% of those queationed supported the reo. "J) C 0 ""- f l C..~ ,....._ ; l ~, ~'- r- ~~l f\(;) ·"' -- t I\. •..H) \
newaJ. of caish and carryr ·
· ..
· -

opinion was divided.

:,,) t.

~-

"'fhe next largest number (29.9%) felt the coWltry should not even reinstate tho defunct measure.

Few

(14.7%) supported entrance into the war

if the Allies faced defeat, and even fewer
Britain, France, and Poland,

~hile

(8.9%) proposed supplying

refusing to sell to Germs.ny.

.3B

Deopite the fact that polls are a deceptive form of evidence, they
do indicate opinions, and in conjunction with press and governmental reactione, theed surveys substantiate the thesis upon which thio paper has
been built.

!.

Although more opposed 1~ Hitler than they had been a year

tmrller, although, a!ter the initial war scare coolod, nDre \dlling to
aid Britain and

Franc~,

cally isolationist.

Americans in the fall of

19J9 were i;till basi-

The old feeling that war was fruitleos rernn.ined,

and with it the fear that somohow Ahe United Stateo wo:tl.d be forced once
again to tight a European war for the benefit or Europeans.
CA.4' H. ok. ~::>-.rk..
Franklin Rooaovolt called his wifeflP,t 5 a~m., September 1, to teU
her of the invasion, and her reaction was peobably the
many Americans, even if few would admit it.

She

ca.;nc

as that or

l..VO lt-4-

weked.

two friends, and

the three ladies ant together in tho early morning •
• • • a sense of impending disaster wao on us. The
thing w~ had feared had finally come, and we
seemed t.o know that sooner or later we would be
dragged into the vortex with all the European
countries •••• I had a feeling that ••• thero wae
not much chance for any part of the world to escape it, though in the r:ieantime we hoped for some
miracle_. 39

Mrs.

Roose~elt

wa:; right.

America would not escape the war against

which her husband had fought and into which Europe had blundered.

Hit-

ler would destroy the re:nnanta of Pax Brittanxa, forcing the United
States to lead

th~

tree world, for isolationism, an earneot desire to be

left al.one, could not survive the death of the old order.
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REACTION 1Q l·:UNICH SETTLE:·ZNT
!-'.a'\azine

Date

Atlantic Monthly
Christian C~n~urz
Current History
Harper's
Nation
Newsweek
Ne_w Repuhl i o
Time

Nov.
Oct.
Nov.
Nov.
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.

no mention

x
x

12

x
x
x

8
10

12
10

RLt\CTI~N

Magazine

Date

Atlantic Monthly
Christian Century
Current History
Harner's
Nation
Newsweek
~ Republic
Time

Dec.
Nov.
Dec.
Dec.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.

-

Best
possible

Against

19
21
23
21

x

1Q POGROMS

Violently
against

23

x

x

x
x
x
x

?foderately
against
no mention
no mention
no nention

MOOD

Y.a~azine

..lli

JANUARY

Date

Apprehensive

x
x
x
x

.Atlantic Monthl1- survey of month
II
II
II
Christian Century
II
II
II
Current Hi st,ory
II
II
1
ija_rner s
"II II II
Nation
II
II
II
Newsweek
II
II
II
New R~p_Qbl._1._c
II
II
II
'.rime

REACTION .!Q.

Magazine

Date

Atlantic Monthly
Christian Qenturz
Current History
Haroer 1 s
Nation
l{~ Republic
Newsweek
Time

Jan.&Feb.
Jan. 18
Feb.
Feb.
Jan. 7
Jan. 11
Jan. 9
Jan. 23

x
x

Hopeflll;

(no major article)

x

x

REAR~.AHENT

Necessary
no

Unnecessary
m~ntion

x
nc :nentio~
· to exten
wants it.

.-\fa.
x
x

x

x
x

REACTION !Q SEIZ:JRE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA*
:-~gazine

Date

At_lant1-c Mon_th).y
.Christian Century
Current History
Haroer's
Nation
Newsweek
New Republic

April
Mch. 29
April
April
Mch. 25
Mch. 27
Mch, 22
Mch. 27

~

Surprized

Not

no mention

x
x
x
x

no mention

x
x

*All agreed that Hitler had showed true colors.

REACTION TO REICHSTAG SPE:ECH
Magazine

Date

Atlantic Monthly
Qhristian Century
Current History_
Harper's
Nation
Newsweek.
New Republic

May

~

!J.ay 10

Shows chance of oeace

x

Hay
l{ay
May 6

May 8
?·:ay 10

Hay 8

no mention
no mention
no mention

x

No
chance

x
x
x

REACTION .!Q REJECTION
~l.P..P'azine

Date

Atlantic Y~nthly
Christian Century
Current History
Harper's
Nation

Aug.
July
Aug.
Aug.
July
July
July
July

~~ R~liC-

Newsweek

Time

Good

x

26

Date

Atlantic ~.o.nt.lzly_
Christian Q_~f!.~ury
Current H__~
Harper's
tiation

A:.ig.
July 26

R~J!hl,ic

x

-FOR l-SJZCTIOH

Partizanshiu Ioolationis:n

Aug.
July 22
July 19
July 2J..,

17

x
x
x

x

x

Aug.

July

Bed

no mention

22
19
24
17

!faP"a.7.ine

Nett

No difference

no mention

RLASO~JS

Hewswoek
Time

QE N""=.lJTR.ALITY IZGISLATION

x
x
x

no mention

x

Distrust
of R.

x

no mention

x
x
x

x
,.

A

RZACTION

1Q

GSRMA!~-!JSSR

PACT

Ma.gnzine

Dnte

~lli±iili 1-bnthly
Christian Centur~
_Current History
Harper's
Nation

Tke

Oct.
Aug.
Oct.
Oct.
Aug.
Aug.
Aug.
Aug.

Magazine

Date

Disaster

Atlantic Honthly
Christian Century
Current History
Harper's

Oct.

x

New5Week
~~

aepublic

J~ation

Newsweek
~Republic

-

Ti:ne

x

30

x

26
28

x

30
28

Aug. 30
Oct.
Oct.
Aug. 26
Aug. 28
Aug. 30
Au~.

Expected

SurJ:?rize

28

no mention
no mention

x
x
x

No

x

x

x
x
x

no mention
no mention

effect

----------------

P..EACTIO!~

TO

-

----

-----------------------------------------~

~

1·~ai:rnzi no

Date

Allies win

~tlantic.. ?~nthly_

Nov.
Sept. 1.3
Oct.

x
x

9hristian Century
Current History
Haroer 1 s

Til:le

1'.agazine

Date

Atlantic Monthly
Ch~=SL'tian Century
Current History
Harper's
Nation
Mewsweck
~ Republic

Nov.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Sept.
Sept.
Sept.
Sept.

Newsweek
New Repub1 ic

Time

x

uncertain

~foy.

Sept.
Sept.
Sept.
Sept.

Nation

A. lose

9
11
6
ll

x (not certain)

x

uncertain

x

u.s.

in

U.S. out

13
9
11

X(ir Alliea lose)

6
11

uncertain

x
x
x
x
x

x

,-------------------------------------
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The following article~were used to gather the information presented in
the preceding appendices.
....
Jt.unich ·

1.

Month's H~stary in the i1Iaking, 11 Current History, XXXXIX (Hovember, 193B),~ll-12.

2.

Atlantic l.:Onthly, CLXII (November,

11 A

1938)';._

:fo mention.

3.

s 'Peace i'ii th Honor 1 : T~pered by Re serva ti on~;". _·Newsweelf,
XII~(October 10, 1933), pp. 13-lto.
11 Bri tain'

4. "4 Chiefs, One Peace," Time, XXXII (Cc:tober 10, 193B), pp. 15-17.
5.

"Europe After ?·:unich, 11 Christian Century, LV (October
pp. 1224-1226.

6.

Harner' s :it.agazine, CLXXVII (November,

12, 1933),

1933).

No mention.

7.

"Nemesis Postponed, 11 Hew Renublic, LXXXXVI (October
pp. 255-257.

B.

1

12, 19.33),

!The Shape of Things, II The ifation, CXXXXVII (Oct.obtir
pp. 337-341.

a, 1938),

Pogroms

1.

Atlantic !fonthl;z, CI.XII (December,

193B).

No mention.
2.

Current History, XXXXIX (December,

1933).

no mention.

3. Harner' s Hagazine, cr.xxrlIII (December, 1933).
~lo

4.

oention.
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